Uranium diplomacy: Kazakhstan could power Turkey’s nuclear plants

Kazakhstan has proposed a uranium mining and fuel supply deal to support Turkey’s growing nuclear energy ambitions, according to Baurzhan Duisebayev, CEO of the Chemical Engineering Design Bureau.

«Suddenly, Turkey is leading the way: four reactors are under construction there, and it could become a valuable new partner for Kazakhstan,» Duisebayev said during a panel discussion at the MINEX Kazakhstan 2025 mining and exploration forum in Astana.

He noted that the projected fuel demand for Turkey’s planned nuclear facilities is substantial.

«With a total output of 4.8 megawatts — even for just two plants, not counting the third site in Thrace — Turkey would require 1,800 tons of uranium annually. If they mine in Kazakhstan, they’ll need to extract not just 1,800 tons, but between 5,000 and 8,000 tons,» he said. «That’s twice as much as Uzbekistan produces or about one-sixth of Kazakhstan’s current output. So where will they get it?»

Duisebayev noted that his team shared its vision of the nuclear fuel cycle that Turkey could benefit from with authorized Turkish agencies. According to his estimates, 40% of nuclear fuel cycle costs are attributed to uranium mining, 10% to conversion, another 40% to enrichment and the remaining 10% to fuel fabrication.

«We mine uranium here jointly with Russia, while all other stages — conversion, enrichment and fuel production — are carried out in Russia,» he said.

Kazakhstan has suggested a formal partnership, Duisebayev explained, as Turkey’s demand for nuclear fuel is expected to increase. Specifically, he proposed offering Turkey a uranium mining contract in Kazakhstan, as well as the option to participate in the conversion of uranium-containing materials into uranium hexafluoride, a raw material essential for nuclear fuel production.

«What’s the offer? Let’s start with conversion. It’s a well-established operation here, conducted by Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s national nuclear company» he said. «Certainly, getting a contract will take time.»

He also recalled discussions during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Astana on July 2, 2024, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.

«Turkish colleagues asked what topics would be most important in a conversation with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. I told them, ‘Stay focused — push for a uranium contract,’» Duisebayev said. «But they haven’t secured it yet.»

He emphasized that partnering with Kazakhstan could allow Turkey to secure uranium hexafluoride more quickly, helping streamline its nuclear fuel supply chain.

«The next stage is fuel fabrication. Since we already have the capacity — specifically, at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, a Kazatomprom subsidiary — we can easily handle that stage,» Duisebayev said. «In this case, we’d be cooperating with Turkey on three stages of the fuel cycle. The next step would be full cooperation across all stages except enrichment, but we need time to reach that point.»

Duisebayev noted that Kazakhstan had previously partnered with Russia on enrichment. «We carried out enrichment with Russia through two joint ventures — the International Uranium Enrichment Center and the Uranium Enrichment Center (UEC) — but Kazatomprom has since withdrawn.»

In March 2020, Kazatomprom completed the sale of its stake (50% minus one share) in Russia’s UEC to its joint venture partner TVEL, a fuel company of Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear enterprise.

«Turkish, Kazakh and Russian flags could easily fly over all five stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, including the independent construction of nuclear reactors,» Duisebayev said. «That would also include training specialists and building capacity. This strategy was originally developed back in 2008-2009. At the time, Turkey wasn’t involved; our partners were Russia, Canada and Japan. The strategy was approved and initially moved forward. But for various reasons, we stepped back. Frankly, Western partners weren’t eager to share their technologies.»

According to Duisebayev, when he joined Kazatomprom in 2000, the company’s strategy was to acquire nuclear technologies from either Western or Eastern partners. But in the end, he said, very little materialized, aside from the production of 200 tons of fuel assemblies at a joint Kazakh-Chinese venture that supplies Chinese nuclear power plants (NPPs).

«Given that experience, we can take a different approach with Turkey. They’re open to it. It’s critical to start collaborating with Turkish universities now,» he said.

He mentioned that Rosatom has already trained 10,000 specialists for Turkish nuclear power plants at its facility in Obninsk.

Kazakhstan, too, has offered Turkey a comprehensive training program, including instruction on uranium mining operations. Duisebayev noted that Kazakhstan will eventually need to reduce its exports of natural uranium and shift toward supplying more highly processed nuclear products.

«Currently, Kazatomprom exports 24,000 tons of uranium oxides. In the next phase, it should only export converted uranium — tetrafluoride, hexafluoride, etc. Then, it should move to selling only enriched uranium,» he said. «Eventually, we should be exporting only technologies. We wouldn’t sell uranium at all; instead, we’d convert it into electricity ourselves and export energy products.»

The expert noted that Kazakhstan’s long-term strategy accounted for a potential global shift by 2040, when demand for uranium is expected to drop significantly due to the rise of alternative energy sources.

«When these strategies were being developed, people asked: why extract resources so aggressively and unsustainably that they’d be depleted in 20 years?» Duisebayev recalled. «Then the smart answer came: by 2040, uranium won’t be needed. […] In that case, there’s no need to mine more natural uranium.»

He added that speculation about the end of the «uranium era» occasionally surfaced on social media.

«People talk about thorium reactors, and thermonuclear ones are in development too,» he said.

In Duisebayev’s view, uranium conversion could be organized at the Stepnogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine, which is now owned by Rosatom.

«The Stepnogorsk Combine was sold to Rosatom last year. Everyone there was excited to join Rosatom, although the profitability has been fairly low,» he highlighted. «Later, Rosatom floated the idea of producing uranium tetrafluoride at the facility. Two weeks ago, they confirmed that Uranium One, a part of Rosatom, is still a relevant project. So we can move forward, either in partnership with Turkey or directly with Rosatom. We need to produce tetrafluoride at Stepnogorsk, for example.»

He also pointed to Ust-Kamenogorsk and Uralsk as alternative sites for conversion production.

«At the very least, stage-one conversion plants are most feasible in Ust-Kamenogorsk and Stepnogorsk,» he said. «We also have options in the south and in Uralsk, where we have established partners. I’m currently representing the machine-building plant from West Kazakhstan.»

Duisebayev did not clarify whether Turkish officials had made a decision or how far discussions had progressed.

He noted that he spent 18 years working at Kazatomprom. According to the company’s website, he served in 2017 as an adviser to the CEO of Volkovgeologiya, a Kazatomprom subsidiary specializing in geological exploration and drilling.

Russia’s Rosatom is building Turkey’s first NPP Akkuyu under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement. The plant will include four VVER-1200 units with a combined capacity of 4,800 megawatts. In September 2023, Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev estimated the cost of the Akkuyu project at $23 to $24 billion, later revising the figure to $24 to $25 billion. Under the terms of the agreement, Rosatom will supply the plant with nuclear fuel and will also be responsible for removing the spent fuel.